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Whose War Is It Anyway?
Thursday, August 1, 2002

THE RECENT THREAT OF
major war between India and
Pakistan, and the consequent
evacuation warnings issued by
the U.S. State Department and
many foreign governments, have
prompted yet another deferment in the
growth of Indo-U.S. trade. They have
also evinced a sharp reaction from both
business and government leaders in
Delhi.

The reduction in U.S. embassy staffs
and the warnings urging American
citizens to evacuate the country did not
provoke any significant interruptions in
on-going U.S. business activities in India.
Country heads quietly accelerated or
extended summer leaves; developed
contingency plans and back-up systems
to maintain normal activities and protect
vital assets; identified alternative travel
arrangements; postponed some highlevel
visits to India; and delayed
implementation of some new initiatives.

The real impact of the evacuation
warnings has been felt not in India, but
here in the U.S., where Indian
information service companies have their
major market and where American
companies new to market in India have
been alarmed by perceptions of South
Asia as “the most dangerous place on
earth.” For Indian IT and business
services companies, in particular, the
experience has been nearly disastrous.
Major new contracts have been
indefinitely deferred or diverted to other
countries; important investment projects
have been shelved or cancelled. The
continuation of the evacuation notice for
India, modestly down-graded on June
26, is a nightmare for Indian firms
seeking to supply mission-critical
services to U.S. companies.

This asymmetry in impact has led to
sharply differing responses to the events
of late May and early June. U.S.
companies with operations in India have
kept their own counsel, each heeding the
warnings but not publicly challenging
the premises or purposes of the
announcements. In contrast, Indian
business leaders, association heads and
some senior officials have challenged the
premises of the warnings, openly
questioned the motives, and demanded
an immediate withdrawal of the
notifications. Describing the notices as
“the latest sanctions imposed by the
U.S.,” some important business leaders
and officials asserted that the U.S. was
exploiting growing commercial ties
between the two countries for political
advantage.

These declarations are unfortunate in
my view because they are not founded in
fact, needlessly create suspicion and illwill,
undermine a rapidly growing spirit
of cooperation between India and the
U.S., downplay what is turning out to be
an important success in the war on
terrorism, and deflect energy from the
urgent task at hand–which is for U.S. and
Indian industry to cooperate in a
campaign to inform the American
business leadership about the important
opportunities for leveraging U.S. skills
and knowledge through a variety of
technology partnerships with India.

First, it is important to set the record
straight about the evacuation warnings
and the drawdown of U.S. diplomatic
personnel. As every career diplomat will
confirm, it is an absolute imperative that
evacuation warnings must be based on
independent, objective criteria and not
be subject to political calculation or
influence. To do this even once would
destroy the credibility of the warnings
and ultimately endanger American lives.
In this crisis, the analysis was based on a
careful assessment of contingencies and
risks, following well-defined procedures
that have been applied in countless cases
around the world, and which are largely
carried out by consular officials not
involved in high policy decisions.

I have reviewed the decision carefully
with Ambassador Robert Blackwill and
participated in a closed-door briefing
with Assistant Secretary of State
Christina Rocca. I am as certain as I can
be that the decision to issue the notices
was based on a strong conviction that a
major war was highly likely. Sufficient
evidence was available from public
sources: the maximum mobilization of
forces; the ever higher, and unsustainable,
levels of readiness; and a crescendo of
very harsh rhetoric emanating from
leaders in both capitals all pointed to
imminent hostilities. Blackwill and Rocca
certainly had access to even better
information from a variety of classified
sources.

At all stages of the crisis, it was
asserted that India did not desire a major
war with Pakistan and that its main
intention was to mobilize international
action to force Pakistan’s leaders to take
more decisive action to end support for
terrorism. But India’s diplomacy
depended upon a wholly credible threat
of major war and—who can doubt it?—
a strong sense of justice in resorting to
war against Pakistan. One cannot have it
both ways. The threat is either real, in
which case foreign governments are
obligated to warn their citizens, or it’s
not, in which case the threat carries no
weight.

In any event, the outcome of the
crisis, though not yet final, should be
seen by the Indian government, no less
than the U.S. government, as an
important success.The two governments
have worked closely together to achieve
a vital objective in the war on terrorism:
to force Pakistan to follow through on
solemn commitments it has made to
cease official support for, and tolerance
of, terrorist operations in Pakistan.
Making this commitment stick will be
important for stabilizing Kashmir and
allowing legitimate indigenous actors to
engage in the political process. In time, it
should also permit the resumption of the
“Lahore Process” courageously launched
by Prime Minister Vajpayee three years
ago. All told, it opens the door to a
qualitatively new kind of Indo-Pak
relationship, and we can think of the day
when the sword of Damocles that has
hung over the Subcontinent since
Partition will be withdrawn.


Michael T. Clark is executive director of the U.S.-India Business Council, a business
organization that fosters improved trade and investment ties between India and
the U.S. Clark has been advisor to several foreign ambassadors in Washington,
D.C., developed senior policy groups on international financial and security issues,
and served as chief of staff of the Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute. He
graduated with honors from Harvard University and holds a master's in Latin



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