Part of the problem now is that the short-term requirements of destroying al Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan have caused the U.S. government to be silent about a problem that is well understood in Washington: Pakistan’s deep complicity in supporting terrorist forces. The U.S government is aware of Pakistan’s central role in establishing the Taliban as the masters of Afghanistan, of its refusal to constrain the madrassas — the schools of Jihadi terror — of Pakistan’s direct financial, logistical, material, training and operational support for al Qaeda-supported terrorist groups. Given the facts, it is difficult to think of a more piquant example of state-sponsored terrorism.
But if the U.S. is to achieve its objectives in Afghanistan — removing the Taliban and destroying the al Qaeda network — then it needs General Musharraf, his information, his army, his airspace and his compliance. That will not be gained by his humiliation. So American political leaders have become circumspect about Pakistan’s role in aiding and abetting terror.
The low point came when the U.S. Secretary of State and the Indian Minister of External Affairs appeared before the press on the very day of the terror bombings of the Kashmir legislature. Asked point blank if the U.S. recognized this dramatic incident as an act of terror, the Secretary could not find a way to use the words Pakistan and terrorism in a single sentence. Nor has any other senior official of the Administration or the Congressional leadership. Later during his Oct. 16 and 17 visit to New Delhi, Secretary Powell made important statements that have gone a long way to clarify the American position; the Srinagar attack was described as a terrorist attack and the Secretary reaffirmed that U.S. opposition to terrorism extended to Kashmir.
Truth, it is often said, is the first casualty in war. For the time being, telling the truth about Pakistan’s support for cross-border terrorist activity will take a back seat to expediency. Musharraf and his government will get a big break.
For the Indian political leadership as much as for the people on the street, this silence is worse than distasteful, it is unsettling. But nothing since Sept. 11 has eroded the strong Washington consensus that America’s fundamental long-term interest in South Asia lies with India. Vast economic potential, a tremendous reservoir of human resources and intellectual talent, demonstrated commitment to democratic principles and personal freedom, rule of law, reliability, potential for independent action — these have been guiding U.S. foreign policy toward partnership with India.
Partnership is a two-way street and here’s where the true problem lies. Up to Sept. 11, the question being asked with increasing urgency was, ‘What is India prepared to do to move ahead?’
On the econmic front, the answers were not especially convincing. Without reforming its economic base, the country cannot realize its very real potential for world-class leadership. And it is here that India’s response has been most disappointing.
Consider where we are on the following short list of key economic desiderata. The Indian government has promised decisive action on each of these subjects in recent months: Resolution of the Dabhol dispute: We are now in the 11th month of the present round of crisis. Opening to trade: India’s tariff walls remain among the highest in the world, despite the removal of quantitative restrictions. WTO negotiations: As of mid-October, India is the lone holdout against a new round. Privatization: No new major privatizations since February. Sectoral Reform: Key bills on electricity, patents and communications remain bottled up in Parliament.
Perhaps the greatest disappointment has been India’s failure to evolve a meaningful negotiating position on WTO. It is not that India’s position lacks logic, coherence or integrity. Reform of the global patents and anti-dumping regimes, for example, is an urgent necessity. What has been missing is a commitment to engage with the other members on the full range of issues, which can only take place in the context of moving ahead toward a new round. India has every right to urge that any new round be focused and subject to short-time calendars. The U.S. position is not very different, and a strong basis for working together on several key issues already exists.
India can give a considerable boost to world trade and restore business confidence by coming out clearly and promptly for a new round. It loses nothing in the bargain, and has much to gain. In the process the government will remind the world of India’s true strengths, and it will show why, unlike its smaller neighbor, it can make a large difference for the better.
Michael T. Clark is executive director of the U.S.-India Business Council. In his more than twenty years of international policy work, he has been advisor to several foreign ambassadors in Washington, D.C. He graduated with honors from Harvard University and holds a Ph.D. from the Johns Hopkins University.
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