The demonstrated willingness by New Delhi after the jehadi attack on the parliament on December 13 to go to war to end the cross-border terrorism that had been going on for more than l8 years in India's northwestern states had made war a terrifying possibility. The state of Jammu & Kashmir was scheduled to go in for the next round of elections after the six-year of the assembly gets over in September.
The success of the elections free of the threat of violence is a critical indicator of the future course of events. Unfortunately, infiltration across the Line of Control (LoC) has not ended in spite of US assurances that Pakistan has taken steps to do so. And cross-border terrorism goes on. More specifically, political leaders and workers have been targeted for killings and abduction by the jehadis. From the time the election campaign started, nearly 20 political activists had been killed, until a week before polling was to begin. The risk of a major terrorist strike that could force New Delhi to react strongly remains.
The problem would then escalate rapidly. Given the developments so far, the risk of war between the two countries cannot be ruled out. But it is important to make an assessment of how that war might be fought. And what would be the consequences since both Pakistan and India possess nuclear weapons?
The latter factor would dictate the nature of the war. It is, therefore, important to understand this. If the conflict ever leads to an exchange of nuclear weapons, India's policy of not being the first to use them would leave Pakistan with the nuclear hot potato. Its leadership is aware that while its nuclear weapons would do grievous harm to India, an assured retaliation by India would practically destroy Pakistan as a viable state and society. Hence, nuclear deterrence would work in most cases. At the same time, New Delhi would ensure that Pakistan is not pushed into a corner where it feels compelled to use the bomb as "nuclear fidayeen."
The war, therefore, would remain limited, and quite different from what we have experienced in the past decades. In a way, Pakistan's war through terror represents a similar strategy.
New Delhi's aim of using military force across borders would be to apply political-military pressure to make Islamabad change its policy of supporting cross-border terrorism. The intention would not be to capture any significant territory in Pakistan or to destroy any significant portion (like the armored division) of its military. Pakistan has pursued its strategy of war through terrorism over the years on the assumption that this provides it with a "low-cost option" of "bleeding India through a thousand cuts." India's objective would be to raise the costs for Pakistan of its current policy.
The most workable strategy, therefore, would be to undertake what could be called a "salami-slicing" strategy, with each piece of the salami sufficient to hurt, but not enough to provoke a nuclear response. And the act of slicing would be spread over time, giving diplomacy further chances to find an end to terrorism.
The method would be to use artillery barrages across the LoC in Jammu & Kashmir which normally also has a spin-off effect to reduce the potential for infiltration. Infantry attacks on posts across the LoC would also form part of the same plan. In fact, such occasional ones, backed by air strikes on our own side, have been going on since last July.
If these low-key operations do not produce the desired results, commando raids by Special Forces on terrorist camps and launching points/ infrastructure in the vicinity of the LoC would commence. This could go on for weeks and possibly months to give time for diplomacy to play its role as, indeed, the mobilization and deployment period has done.
Pakistan would be expected to fight back, with similar tactics. There may be little military impact from such operations. But this would certainly worry the international community, Fresh measures against both countries are to be expected as we saw in the US travel advisory last summer.
But international diplomatic efforts to end the conflict, of which terrorism is the core, would intensify. If, after some time, there were no permanent rollback and stoppage of cross-border terrorism, further escalatory measures would become necessary.
These would have to include air strikes and longer-range commando attacks on key installations restricted to Pakistan- occupied Kashmir, while we remain strategically defensive elsewhere. We have long practiced special operations with helicopter-commando forces for special tasks. In fact, such tactics were used even in the Jaffna area in late 1987.
The coup de grace would come with air strikes in occupied Kashmir if all other steps do not produce the desired results. India has both a quantitative, as well as a qualitative, superiority in the air.
Pakistan Air Force's inventory of high-technology aircraft now has around 32 F-16 aircraft (out of 40 supplied in 1981), while the remaining 320 aircraft are older Mirage IIIs and Vs, and Chinese MiG-21s which are inferior to Indian MiG-21s. The Indian Air Force, on the other hand, possesses 40 Su-30MK multi-role combat aircraft-which are the top-of-the-line and state-of-the-art-comparable to the later versions of the US F-5 Strike Eagle.
In addition, nearly four dozen Mirage-2000 capable of highly accurate precision guided weapons delivery, and 75 MiG-29 air superiority fighters form the first line with 160-odd MiG-27 and 130 Jaguar strike aircraft. Close to 350 MiG-21s perform the role of workhorse.
Pakistan, therefore, would have serious difficulties in trying to interfere with air strikes, and, with a military man at the top, it fully knows that. The probability is that the threat of a war, which would be a war in slow motion, would be sufficient to achieve our political goals.
